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Matching the profiles of a user across multiple online social net-
works brings opportunities for new services and applications as
well as new insights on user online behavior, yet it raises serious
privacy concerns. Prior literature has proposed methods to match
profiles and showed that it is possible to do it accurately, but using
evaluations that focused on sampled datasets only. In this paper, we
study the extent to which we can reliably match profiles in practice,
across real-world social networks, by exploiting public attributes,
i.e., information users publicly provide about themselves. Today’s
social networks have hundreds of millions of users, which brings
completely new challenges as a reliable matching scheme must
identify the correct matching profile out of the millions of possible
profiles. We first define a set of properties for profile attributes–
Availability, Consistency, non-Impersonability, and Discriminabil-
ity (ACID)–that are both necessary and sufficient to determine the
reliability of a matching scheme. Using these properties, we pro-
pose a method to evaluate the accuracy of matching schemes in
real practical cases. Our results show that the accuracy in prac-
tice is significantly lower than the one reported in prior literature.
When considering entire social networks, there is a non-negligible
number of profiles that belong to different users but have similar at-
tributes, which leads to many false matches. Our paper sheds light
on the limits of matching profiles in the real world and illustrates
the correct methodology to evaluate matching schemes in realistic
scenarios.
1. INTRODUCTION
Internet users are increasingly revealing information about different
aspects of their personal life on different social networking sites.
Consequently, there is a growing interest in the potential for ag-
gregating user information across multiple sites, by matching user
accounts across the sites, to develop a more complete profile of
individual users than the profile provided by any single site. For
instance, companies like PeekYou [26] and Spokeo [3] offer “peo-
ple search” services that can be used to retrieve publicly visible
information about specific users that is aggregated from across a
multitude of websites. Some companies are mining data posted by
job applicants on different social networking sites as part of back-
ground checks [31], while others allow call centers to pull up social
profiles when their customers call [30]. The many applications of
matching profiles across social networking sites also raise many le-
gitimate and serious concerns about the privacy of users. A debate
on the relative merits of leveraging profile matching techniques for
specific applications is out of the scope of this paper.
In this paper, our goal is to investigate the reliability of tech-
niques for matching profiles across large real-world online social
networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, using only publicly avail-
able profile attributes, such as names, usernames, location, pho-
tos, and friends. Reliability refers to the extent to which different
profiles belonging to the same user can be matched across social
networks, while avoiding mistakenly matching profiles belonging
to different users. Matching schemes need to be highly reliable
because incorrectly matched profiles communicate an inaccurate
portrait of a user and could have seriously negative consequences
for the user in many application scenarios. For example, Spokeo
has been recently sued over providing inaccurate information about
a person which caused “actual harm” to the person employment
prospects [4]. We focus on publicly available profile attributes be-
cause data aggregators today can crawl and leverage such informa-
tion for matching profiles.
Recently, a number of schemes have been proposed for match-
ing profiles across different social networks [22, 28, 34, 12, 21,
14] (we review them in §9.) The potential of these schemes to
reliably match profiles in practice, however, has not been systemat-
ically studied. Specifically, it is not clear how or what properties of
profile attributes affect the reliability of the matching schemes. Fur-
thermore, the training and testing datasets for evaluating the match-
ing schemes are often opportunistically generated and they consti-
tute only a small subset of all user profiles in social networks. It is
unclear whether the reliability results obtained over such datasets
would hold over all user profiles in real-world social networks,
where there are orders of magnitude more non-matching profiles
than matching profiles (i.e., there is a huge class imbalance).
Our first contribution lies in defining a set of properties for pro-
file attributes–Availability, Consistency, non-Impersonability, and
Discriminability (ACID)–that are both necessary and sufficient to
determine the reliability of a matching scheme (§3). Analyzing the
ACID properties of profile attributes reveals the significant chal-
lenges associated with matching profiles reliably in practice (§4).
First, data in real-world social networks is often noisy – users do
not consistently provide the same information across different sites.
Second, with hundreds of millions of profiles, there is a non-trivial
chance that there exist multiple profiles with very similar attributes
(e.g., same name, same location) leading to false matches. Finally,
attackers create profiles attempting to impersonate other users, fun-
damentally limiting the reliability of any profile matching scheme.
Another key contribution lies in our method for carefully se-
lecting the training and testing datasets for matching profiles (§5).
When we evaluate the main types of matching schemes in the liter-
ature (based on binary classifiers) using a small random sample
of Twitter and Facebook profiles (similar to how these schemes
were evaluated originally), the schemes achieve over 90% recall
and 95% precision (§6.1). Unfortunately, when we evaluate these
schemes over datasets sampled carefully to preserve the reliability
that the schemes would have achieved over the larger datasets (full
Facebook database), their performance drops significantly (§6.2).
We could obtain only a 19% recall for a 95% precision.
We then investigate if we could improve the reliability of match-
ing schemes in scenarios where we know that there is at most one
matching profile (see §7). In such scenarios, we propose a new
matching scheme and show that it is indeed possible to improve
the recall to 29% at 95% precision. This is still considerably lower
than the high recall (90%) reported in the literature.
Thus, we discover a fundamental limitation in matching profiles
across existing social networks using public attributes. To further
confirm the inherent limits of reliably matching profiles in practice,
we compare the reliability of automated matching schemes with
that of human Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers. Under
similar conditions, AMT workers are able to match only 40% of
the profiles with a 95% precision. Our analysis is the first to high-
light that achieving high reliability in matching profiles across large
real-world social networks comes at a significant cost (in terms of
reduced recall).
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we define the problem of matching profiles, we
present the constraints we have to consider and discuss how we
approach the problem.
The profile matching problem: We consider that two profiles in
two social networks match if they belong to/are managed by the
same user. The profile matching problem is: given a profile a1
in one large social network SN1, find all its matching profiles in
another large social network SN2, if at least one exists. We will
denote by a2 generic profiles in SN2 and by aˆ2 matching profiles
of a1. For conciseness, we will also write a2-match-a1 if a2 is a
matching profile of a1 and a2-non-match-a1 otherwise.
Note that we address here the problem of matching individual
profiles, which is different from the problem of matching two en-
tire social networks or databases. The difference is that we do not
assume that we have access to all the data in SN1 but only to one
profile. For example, we cannot match profiles by exploiting pat-
terns in the graph structure of SN1 and SN2, and we cannot opti-
mize the matching of a profile in SN1 based on the matchings of
other profiles in SN1. Thus, we cannot take advantage of some
methods proposed for de-anonymizing social graphs [23, 15] and
entity matching [9].
Our problem formulation is motivated by practical scenarios.
There are many people search engines such as Spokeo that allow
users to search for data about a particular person. These services
gather data about a person by matching the profiles a person has on
multiple social networks.
We are particularly interested in two instantiations of the prob-
lem that are motivated by practical scenarios: (1) the generic case
– a profile can have multiple matching profiles in SN2; and (2) the
special case – a profile can have at most one matching profile. This
case is suited for matching social networks such as Facebook or
LinkedIn that enforce users to have only one profile.
Features: In this paper, we investigate the extent to which we can
match profiles by exploiting the attributes users publicly provide in
their profiles such as their real names, screen names (aka. username
– name that appears in the URL of the profile), location, profile
photos, and friends. Using this information we can ideally match
any person that maintains the same persona on different social net-
works. Also, we choose these attributes because they are essential
to find people online and they are present and usually remain public
across different social networks even if users make all their other
content, such as their posts and photos, private. For profile a1 (resp.
a2), we denote by v1 (resp. v2) the value of a considered attribute.
From attribute values, we define a feature as the similarity between
the values of profiles in SN1 and SN2: s(v1, v2).
Matching scheme as a binary classifier: Most previous works
solved the matching problem by building binary classifiers that,
given two profiles a1 and a2, determine whether a1 and a2 are
matching or not [21, 29, 33, 27, 34, 22, 25, 20]. The binary classi-
fier takes as input a feature vector f(a1, a2) that captures the simi-
larity between each attribute of a pair of profiles (a1, a2); and then
outputs the probability p of a1 and a2 to match. By selecting a cut-
off threshold for p the classifier returns 1 (i.e., matching profiles) if
p is larger than the threshold; and 0 otherwise. We say that a match-
ing scheme outputs a true match when the matched profiles belong
to the same user and outputs a false match when the matched pro-
files belong to different users. The threshold’s choice constitutes
the standard tradeoff between increasing the number of true match
and decreasing the number of false matches.
This solution works well for the generic case of our matching
problem. Given a profile a1, we can use the binary classifier to
check, for every pair of profiles (a1, a2) such that a2 ∈ SN2,
whether it is matching or not. We can then output any profile a2
that the binary classifier declares as matching. In this paper, we
test such approach when we represent (a1, a2) with five features,
each corresponding to the similarity score between a1 and a2 for
each of the five profile attributes: real name, screen name, location,
photo, and friends.
For the special case of our matching problem, the previous ap-
proach is vulnerable to output many false matches. For this case,
instead of independently judging whether each pair (a1, a2) is a
match or not, we can compare (for a given a1) the probabilities
p for all pairs (a1, a2) to judge which profile is most likely the
matching profile of a1. We discuss this case in more detail in §7.
Reliability of a profile matching scheme: In this paper our fo-
cus is on the reliability of matching schemes. A reliable match-
ing scheme should ensure that the profile it finds indeed matches
with high probability, i.e., the matching scheme does not have many
false matches. If there is no clear matching profile in SN2 for a1,
then the scheme should return nothing.
Many previous studies used the true and the false positive rate to
evaluate their matching schemes. The true positive rate is the per-
centage of matching profiles that are identified, while the false pos-
itive rate is the percentage of non-matching profiles that are false
matches. The goal is to have a high true positive rate and a low false
positive rate. These metrics are, however, a misleading indicator of
the reliability of a matching scheme because they are not suited for
scenarios with high class imbalance, i.e., the number of matching
profiles is much lower than the number of non-matching profiles.
For example, a matching scheme with a 90% true positive rate for a
1% false positive rate might seem reliable, however, if we use it in a
scenario where we have 1,000 matching and 999,000 non-matching
profiles, the matching scheme would output 900 true matches and
9,990 false matches, which is clearly unreliable. In real-world so-
cial networks, the class imbalance is even higher (e.g., for each
matching profile we have over 1 billion non-matching profiles in
Facebook) thus the scheme would output even more false matches.
This paper argues that better metrics to evaluate the reliability of
a matching scheme are the precision and recall. The recall is the
percentage of matching profiles that are identified, while the pre-
cision the percentage of all pairs returned by the matching scheme
which are true matches. The goal is to have a high recall and a high
precision. In the previous example, we would have 90% recall for
a 8% precision, which shows the low reliability of the scheme (out
of all matched profiles only 8% are true matches). Thus, the best
way to show the reliability of a matching scheme is to evaluate its
precision and recall with realistic class imbalance. In the rest of the
paper, by reliable we mean a precision higher than 95%.
3. THE ACID FRAMEWORK
The natural question that arises when investigating the reliability
of matching schemes is: what does the reliability depends on? Un-
doubtedly, the reliability depends on the attributes we consider for
matching and on their properties. Thus, given an attribute, what
properties should the attribute have in order to enable a reliable
profile matching? We propose a set of four properties to help cap-
ture the quality of different attributes to match profiles: Availability,
Consistency, non-Impersonability, and Discriminability (ACID).
Availability: At first, to enable finding the matching profile, an
attribute should have its value available in both social networks.
If only 5% of users provided information about their “age” across
two sites, then “age” has limited utility in matching profiles. To
formalize this notion, we model the attribute values of a1 and each
a2 ∈ SN2 as random variables and we define the availability of an
attribute as:
A = Pr
(
v1 and v2 available
∣∣a2-match-a1) .
Consistency: It is crucial that the selected attribute is consistent
across matching profiles, i.e., users provide the same or similar at-
tribute values across the different profiles they manage. Formally,
we define the consistency of an attribute as:
C = Pr
(
s(v1, v2) > th
∣∣a2-match-a1, v1 and v2 available) ,
where th is a threshold parameter.
non-Impersonability: If an attribute can be easily impersonated,
i.e., faked, then attackers can compromise the reliability of the
matching by creating fake profiles that appear to be matching with
the victim’s profiles on other sites. Some public attributes like
“name” and “profile photo” are easier to copy than others such
as “friends”. To formalize this notion, we introduce the notation
a2-impersonate-a1 to denote that profile a2 has been created by
an attacker impersonating profile a1. We denote the probability
that there exists at least one profile a2 impersonating a1 by pI =
Pr(a1 is impersonated) and the probability that there is no profile
impersonating a1 by pnI = 1 − pI . The difficulty to manipulate
an attribute is characterized by its non-Impersonability defined as:
nI = Pr
(
max
a2:a2-impersonate-a1
s(v1, v2) < th
)
.
Discriminability: Even without impersonations, in order to enable
finding the matching profile, an attribute needs to uniquely identify
a profile in SN2. A highly discriminating attribute would have a
unique and different value for each profile, while a less discrim-
inating attribute would have similar values for many profiles. For
example, “name” is likely to be more discriminating than “gender”.
Formally, we define the discriminability of an attribute as:
D = Pr
(
max
a2:a2-non-match-a1
s(v1, v2) < th
∣∣a1 not impersonated
)
.
In practice, it is impossible to estimate D unless we are able to
identify impersonating profiles. Instead, we estimate:
D˜ = Pr
(
max
a2:a2-non-match-a1
s(v1, v2) < th
)
.
D˜ represents the “effective discriminability” taking into account
possible impersonations. Since impersonators create non-matching
profiles as similar as possible to the original profile, it is reasonable
to assume that D˜ ≤ D. Moreover, by application of Bayes for-
mula, we can show that D ≤ D˜/pnI so that, if pI is not too large,
D˜ gives a good estimate of D. If we assume that the impersonating
profiles are independent from the other non-matching profiles, we
can also prove that D˜ = D · (pnI + nI · pI). This clearly shows
that D˜ is close to D if either the attribute is hard to impersonate (nI
close to one) or the proportion of impersonator is small (pI small).
The ACID properties are clear and intuitive properties that help
understand the potential of an attribute to perform reliable match-
ing, as the following theorem formalizes. 1
THEOREM 1. Consider a classifier based on a given attribute
that classifies as matching profiles if s(v1, v2) > th. The perfor-
mance of the classifier is characterized by the following results.
(i) We have
recall = C ·A.
(ii) Assume that, for each profile a1 ∈ SN1, there is at most one
matching profile in SN2. Then,
precision ≤
recall
recall + 1− D˜
.
(iii) Assume that pI > 0. Then, precision = recall = 1 iif
A = C = nI = D = 1.
In Theorem 1, the threshold parameter th must be the same as
the one in the definitions of C, nI and D. Theorem 1-(i) shows
that the classifier’s recall is simply the product of consistency and
availability. Theorem 1-(ii) gives a simple upper bound of the pre-
cision as a function of the effective discriminability (which itself
is a function of the discriminability and of the impersonability, see
above). This upper bound gives a good order of magnitude for the
precision; moreover, for high precision (which is what we aim),
given the small number of false positives, the true precision should
be close to the bound. Finally, Theorem 1-(iii) confirms that a high
value of all four ACID properties is necessary and sufficient to ob-
tain high precision and recall.
Properties A, C and nI are independent of the network scale,
however, the discriminability very largely depends on the network
scale since having more non-matching pairs decreases the probabil-
ity that none of them has a high similarity score. This implies that
we must estimate the precision and the recall of a matching scheme
using datasets that accurately capture the ACID properties of pro-
file attributes of the entire social network. Otherwise, the precision
and the recall will be incorrect.
In practice different attributes satisfy the properties to different
extent and the challenge is to combine different attributes with im-
perfect properties to achieve a reliable matching. The next section
analyzes the ground truth for several large social networks to un-
derstand the limits of matching profiles across different sites.
4. LIMITS OF MATCHING PROFILES
To understand the limits of matching profiles, we analyze the ACID
properties of profile attributes (screen name, real name, location,
profile photo, and friends) across six popular social networks (Face-
book, Twitter, Google+, LinkedIn, Flickr, and MySpace). First we
present our method to gather ground truth of matching profiles and
we then analyze each property separately.
4.1 Ground truth of matching profiles
Gathering ground truth of matching profiles spanning multiple so-
cial networks is challenging and many previous works manually
1The proof can be found in the Appendix A.
Table 1: Number of ground truth matching profiles obtained with Friend
Finder (DATASET FF) and Google+ (DATASET G+) for different combina-
tions of social networks.
DATASET FF DATASET G+
TWITTER - FACEBOOK 4,182 76,332
LINKEDIN - FACEBOOK 2,561 20,145
TWITTER - FLICKR 18,953 35,208
LINKEDIN - TWITTER 2,515 20,439
Table 2: Availability of attributes for DATASET FF.
Legend: Tw = Twitter, Fb = Facebook, Fl = Flickr, Lnk = LinkedIn.
Screen Name Real Name Profile Photo Location Friends
TW 100% 100% 69% 54% 86%
FB 100% 100% 98% 52% 60%
FL 100% 30% 29% 11% 40%
LNK 100% 100% 57% 99% 0%
FB - TW 100% 100% 69% 30% 43%
FB - LNK 100% 100% 56% 54% 0%
TW - FL 100% 30% 24% 8% 32%
LNK- TW 100% 100% 44% 54% 0%
labeled profiles [18, 33, 27]. Below we describe two automatic
methods that we used to obtain our ground truth.
We first obtained ground truth data by exploiting “Friend Finder”
mechanisms on many social networks that allow a user to find her
friends by their emails. We used a list of email addresses collected
by colleagues for an earlier study analyzing spam email [16].2 These
email addresses were collected on a machine instructed to send
spam by a large bot network. Since spammers target the public
at large we believe that this list of emails catch a representative set
of users. To combat abuse, some social networks limit the number
of queries one can make with their “Friend Finder” mechanism and
employ techniques to make an automated matching of an email to
a profile ID impossible. Hence, we were only able to collect the
email-to-profile ID matching for Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and
Flickr. Table 1 summarizes the number of matching profiles we
obtained using the Friend Finder mechanism (DATASET FF).3
Some previous works obtained ground truth from users that will-
ingly provide links to their profiles in different social networks.
Such users might not represent users in general because they want
their profiles to be linked and probably expend the effort to keep
their profiles synced. To be able to compare our results against pre-
vious works we collected DATASET G+ (see Table 1) by exploiting
the fact that Google+ allows users to explicitly list their profiles
in other social networks on their profile pages. Due to space con-
straints, for the rest of the paper, we show by default the results
for profiles in DATASET FF and occasionally, for comparison, we
show the results are for DATASET G+.
4.2 Attribute availability
The availability of attributes depends on the social network, for
example Twitter does not ask users about their age while Facebook
does. The availability also depends on whether users choose to
input the information and make it public. Users might choose to let
their location public on Twitter while make it private on Facebook.
Table 2 shows the breakdown of attribute availability per social
network and pairs of social networks. The availability per social
network characterizes the behavior of users, while the availability
for pairs of social networks corresponds to the definition of A in §3.
First, we find that the availability of the attributes varies consid-
erably across the different social networks. For example, users are
2The local IRB approved the collection.
3To test the representativeness of DATASET FF, we compare the distribu-
tion of properties such as account creation date, number of followers, and
number of tweets of Twitter profiles in our dataset with the same properties
of random Twitter profiles. We found that the pairs of distributions for each
property matched fairly closely.
more likely to provide their location information on LinkedIn than
they are on Facebook or Twitter. The differences in availability are
presumably due to the different ways in which users use these sites.
For our purposes, it highlights the additional information one could
learn about a user by linking her profiles on different sites.
Second, we find that screen name and real name are considerably
more available than location or friends. However, the availability of
the less available attributes is not negligible – for example, location
and friends are available for more than 30% of matching profiles in
Twitter and Facebook.
Third, when we compare the availability using DATASET FF and
DATASET G+ (not shown), we observe that the availability of at-
tributes for profiles in the DATASET FF is much lower than the
availability for profiles in the DATASET G+ (e.g., profile photo
is available for only 69% of Twitter users in DATASET FF while
it is available for 96% of users DATASET G+).4 Thus, users in
DATASET G+ are more likely to complete their profiles and conse-
quently there is a higher bound on the recall to match them.
4.3 Attribute consistency
We now study the extent to which users provide consistent attribute
values for their profiles on different social networks. Some users
deliberately provide different attribute values either out of concerns
for privacy or out of a desire to assume online personas different
from their offline persona. It would be very hard to match profiles
of such users by exploiting their public attributes.
Other users may input slightly different values for an attribute
across sites. For example, a user might specify her work place
as International Business Machines on one site and International
Business Machines Corporation on another site.
Similarity metrics for profile attributes: We borrow a set of stan-
dard metrics from prior work in security, information retrieval, and
vision communities to compute similarity between the values of
attributes: the Jaro distance [10] to measure the similarity between
names and screen names; the geodesic distance to measure the sim-
ilarity between locations; the phash [2] and SIFT [19] algorithms
to detect whether two photos are the same; and the number of com-
mon friends between two profiles. Please check our Appendix B
for a full description of these metrics.
Similarity thresholds for attribute consistency: Clearly the more
similar two values of an attribute, the greater the chance that the
values are consistent, i.e., they refer to the same entity, be it a name
or photo or location. Here, we want to show consistency results for
a “reasonable” threshold beyond which we can declare with high
confidence that the attribute values are consistent (irrespective of
the tradeoff between consistency and discriminability in §3). The
best to judge whether two attribute values are consistent are hu-
mans. Thus, we gathered ground truth data by asking Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (AMT) users to evaluate whether pairs of attribute
values are consistent or not. We randomly select 100 pairs each
of matching and non-matching Twitter and Facebook profiles from
DATASET FF and asked AMT users to annotate which attribute val-
ues are consistent and which are not. We followed the guidelines
to ensure good quality results from AMT workers [7].
For each attribute, we leverage the AMT experiment to select the
similarity thresholds to declare two values as consistent. Specifi-
cally, we select similarity thresholds, such that more than 90% of
the consistent values, as identified by AMT workers, and less than
10% of the inconsistent values have high similarities. Note that,
we only use these thresholds to evaluate whether attribute values in
4For more results on DATASET G+, we refer the reader to [11].
Table 3: Consistency of attributes for users in DATASET FF; † in paren-
thesis, the consistency only when information is available in both social
networks.
Screen Name Real Name Location Profile Photo Friends
Fb - Tw 38% 77% 23% (77%†) 8% (12%) 34% (79%)
Fb - Lnk 71% 97% 44% (83%) 11% (23%) 0%
Tw - Fl 40% 25% (84%) 5% (67%) 5% (22%) 13% (42%)
Tw - Lnk 36% 83% 39% (71%) 13% (31%) 0%
matching profiles are consistent and we do not use them to actu-
ally match profiles. Thus, while it is important that the majority of
consistent values pass the threshold, it is not critical if some incon-
sistent values also pass the threshold. Incidentally, this experiment
also shows that the similarity metrics we choose are consistent with
what humans think it is similar. Note that, it is unpractical to use
AMT workers to estimate the threshold for friends, thus we manu-
ally choose it be at least two friends in common to avoid noise.
Attribute consistency in matching profiles: Table 3 shows the
proportion of users who provide consistent values for an attribute
in a pair of social networks out of all users.This proportion corre-
sponds to the recall we can achieve using the attribute given the
threshold used, as shown in the previous section. In parenthesis,
we also provide the equivalent proportion of users with consistent
values only when the attribute value is available in both social net-
works (corresponding to the definition of C). This proportion bet-
ter illustrates how likely users are to provide consistent values, i.e.,
shows the users’s attempt to maintain synched profiles.
First, we find that a large fraction of users provides similar real
names across different social networks. Put differently, most users
are not attempting to maintain distinct personas on different sites.
This trend bodes well for our ability to match the profiles of a user.
Second, we computed the percentage of matching profiles in
Twitter and Facebook for which all public attributes in Table 3 are
inconsistent. We find that there are 7% of such users. These users
are likely assuming different personas on different sites and it is
very hard, if not impossible, to match their profiles using only the
public attributes that we consider in this paper. Thus, we can at
most hope to match profiles for 93% of users. This percentage rep-
resents an upper bound on the recall for matching profiles based on
public attributes.
Third, the consistency differs between different social networks.
Twitter and Facebook have one of the lowest consistency for each
attribute while Facebook and LinkedIn have the highest consis-
tency. Thus, users are more likely to maintain synched profiles
across Facebook and LinkedIn than other pairs of social networks.
4.4 Attribute discriminability
The previous section showed that a large fraction of users have con-
sistent attribute values between their profiles. However, the number
of profiles that we can match reliably is smaller because attribute
values might not uniquely identify a single person.
To evaluate the discriminability of attributes, for each Twitter
profile we compare the similarity of the matching Facebook profile
with the similarity of the most similar non-matching Facebook pro-
file. Figure 1 shows the CDF of similarity scores in DATASET FF
(sample). Zero means no similarity and one means perfect simi-
larity; except for location, where zero means perfect similarity be-
cause it corresponds to the distance between locations. The vertical
lines represent the similarity thresholds for consistent attribute val-
ues used in the previous subsection. Given a threshold, we have
perfect discriminability if there are no non-matching profiles with
higher similarities. Concretely, for a given similarity threshold (x
value), the y value for the distribution for the most similar non-
matching profile represents an estimate of the (effective) discrim-
inability D˜, whereas the y value for the distribution of matching
profiles represents the complementary of the recall 1− C ·A.
For the real name and screen name we see a clear distinction be-
tween distributions of matching and non-matching profiles in Fig-
ure 1. The highest similarity of non-matching profiles is around
0.75 while a number matching profiles have similarities around 1.
This suggests that these attributes have a high discriminability. For
photo, the two distributions are generally similar. The photo does
not appear to have a very good overall discriminability because
there are not many Facebook matching profiles that use the same
profile photo with the Twitter profile. However, for similarities
large than 0.10, when the profile photos are consistent, there are
not many non-matching profiles. As expected, the location does
not have a good discriminability; even in a small dataset there are
Facebook non-matching profiles with the same location as the Twit-
ter profile. Finally, friends have a good discriminability between
matching and non-matching profiles, i.e., it is uncommon to have
non-matching profiles with many common friends.
We do not have access to the whole Facebook dataset to evaluate
the discriminability of all attributes over an entire social network,
however, we exploit the Facebook Graph Search to estimate the
discriminability of real names and screen names. For each Twitter
profile we use Facebook Graph Search to retrieve all the profiles
with the same or similar names and screen names. This proce-
dure samples the non-matching profiles with the highest similarity;
therefore it preserves the discriminability of the entire social net-
work. Figure 1a and 1b also presents the discriminability of real
names and screen names over the entire Facebook (entire). As ex-
pected, the CDF of similarity score for non-matching profiles is
much lower than it was at small scale. Furthermore, for 60% of the
Twitter profiles, there is a non-matching Facebook profile that has
exactly the same real name and for 25% exactly the same screen
name. Even worse, the CDFs of Figure 1a for non-matching pro-
files are even below the CDFs for matching profiles which means
that in many cases there are non-matching profiles that have even
more similar names with the Twitter profile than the matching pro-
file. These results show that names and screen names are actually
not so discriminating in practice and consequently shows the dif-
ficulty of reliably finding the matching profile in real-world social
network. This also shows the risk of evaluating matching scheme
over a sampled dataset because attributes have a much higher dis-
criminability than over entire social networks.
4.5 Attribute impersonability
In most social networks a user is not required to prove that her on-
line identity matches her offline person. Since there is a lot of per-
sonal data publicly available, it is very easy for attackers to create
fake profiles that impersonate honest users. Because such attacks
could be a very big source of unreliability for matching schemes,
we show evidence that such attacks indeed exist and they are more
frequent than previously assumed.
To search for potential cases of impersonation we start with an
initial set of 1.4 million random profiles in Twitter. We find that,
strikingly, a large fraction of profiles could be potential victims of
impersonation attacks: 18,662 Twitter profiles have at least another
Twitter profile with consistent profile attributes. This gives a rough
estimate of pI of 1%. It is beyond the scope of this paper to thor-
oughly investigate such attacks but in §7 we propose a way to make
matching schemes less vulnerable to impersonation attacks.
5. TRAINING & TESTING MATCHING
SCHEMES
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Figure 1: CDF of similarity scores for the matching Facebook profiles and for the most similar non-matching Facebook profile in DATASET FF (sample) and
the entire Facebook (entire).
In this section, we focus our attention on the datasets used to train
and evaluate (test) matching schemes. To estimate well the preci-
sion and recall in practice, we should test for each profile a1 the
accuracy of finding the matching profiles aˆ2 out of all the profiles
a2 ∈ SN2. If we consider large social networks like Facebook,
Twitter, or Google+, SN2 has hundreds of millions of profiles. Ob-
taining such complete datasets is impractical, thus, we have to sam-
ple a number of profiles in the network.
Most previous studies sampled datasets by picking matching and
non-matching profiles at random. Such random sampling fails to
capture the precision and recall of matching schemes in practice
because it severely over-estimates the discriminability of attributes
found in the original social network (as seen in §4.4) and therefore
it severely over-estimates precision. To estimate well the reliability
of a matching scheme in practice, the sampled dataset needs to pre-
serve the precision and recall of the original social network at least
for high values of precision. The key to ensure this is to sample all
potential false matches, i.e., all profiles that could be mistakenly
matched by the matching scheme. Thus, we build two datasets: (1)
a reliability non-preserving sampled dataset for comparison with
previous techniques (as this is the standard evaluation method); and
(2) a reliability preserving sampled dataset that strives to capture
all possible false matches in a social network to better estimate the
reliability of matching schemes in practice.
We generate a reliability preserving sampled dataset for match-
ing Twitter and Facebook. Although building such dataset for other
social networks is possible, the process is strenuous. Instead, we
take two of the most popular social networks to show the limita-
tions for matching profiles across real-world social networks.
Reliability-non-preserving sampling: We randomly sample 850
matching Twitter-Facebook profiles from DATASET FF and we use
them to build 722,500 pairwise combinations of Twitter-Facebook
profiles (850 positive and 721,650 negative examples). We call the
resulting dataset the RANDOM-SAMPLED. The RANDOM-SAMPLED
dataset preserves the availability and consistency of attributes in the
original social network, but it does not preserve the discriminabil-
ity and non-impersonability. Thus, the dataset does not preserve the
precision of the original social network. Note that, datasets such as
DATASET G+, which have been used in previous work, do not even
preserve the availability and consistency of attributes because they
are biased towards a particular kind of users (as seen in §4.2); hence
they do not preserve recall.
Reliability-preserving sampling: To preserve the reliability over
the original social network, our sampling strategy is to sample non-
matching profiles that have a reasonably high similarity to a1 and
ignore non-matching profiles that have a very small chance of match-
ing. We note the set of most similar profiles to a1 in SN2 as
C(a1) ⊂ SN2. A comprehensive C(a1) includes all the Facebook
profiles which could be potential false matches.
Given that our analysis in §4.3 shows that most Twitter-Facebook
matching profiles have consistent real names or screen names, we
hope to build a comprehensive C(a1) by exploiting the Facebook
search API, which allows searching for people by name. For each
Twitter profile, a1 (we sample the same Twitter profiles from RANDOM-
SAMPLED), we generate C(a1) using the Facebook search API to
find profiles with the same or similar real name or screen name as
a1. The resulting dataset, which we call EMULATED-LARGE, con-
tains over 270,000 combinations of profiles (a1, a2) where a2 ∈
C(a1). Thus, for each Twitter profile the dataset contains in aver-
age 320 Facebook profiles with similar names.
Our analysis shows that the matching profile of a1 is in C(a1)
(i.e., aˆ2 ∈ C(a1)) for 70% of Twitter profiles. This implies that for
70% of cases we selected at least all non-matching profiles with
higher name similarity than the matching profile. Additionally,
the median similarity of the least similar real name in C(a1) is
0.5, while the median similarity of matching profiles is 0.97. This
means that we also catch many Facebook profiles with lower name
similarity than the matching profiles. Thus, the only possible false
matches that we miss are the ones that have very different names.
Note that the reliability preserving sampling does not sample the
matching profile when there is little chance for it to match (in 30%
of the cases). We actually tried to train and test matching schemes
with or without including the unsampled matching profiles in the
EMULATED-LARGE and the reliability did not differ significantly.
Our sampling strategy ensures that the discriminability and im-
personability of real names and screen names found in the real-
world datasets are preserved. It might over-estimate, however, the
discriminability of location, friends, and profile photos since we do
not sample in C(a1) profiles with similar location, friends or pho-
tos if they do not also have similar names or screen names. Evalu-
ating matching schemes over C(a1) rather than all SN2 could lead
to an under-estimation of the false matches. Thus, the precision
we obtain over this dataset is an upper bound on the precision in
practice. This implies that the limits of reliably matching schemes
in practice can only be worse than what we show in this paper. We
believe, however, that our sampling strategy gives a very good idea
of the precision and recall in the real-world datasets because there
will be very few false matches (if any) with very dissimilar names
even if they have similar location, photo or friends.
Another limitation of the dataset is that it does not contain cases
where a profile a1 has multiple matching profiles in SN2. This is a
consequence of our method to gather ground truth (§4.1) that only
gives a single matching profile in SN2 for each a1. The implica-
tions of this limitation on our evaluation is that there might be some
matching profiles that we consider as false matches whereas they
are not. Since Facebook enforces the policy that users should only
have one profile, we believe there are not many such cases and the
reliability we measure is likely close to the real-world reliability.
In practice, there are Twitter users that do not have a match-
ing Facebook profile, but our datasets do not contain such cases.
To evaluate how matching schemes perform in such scenarios, we
test in §7 the reliability of matching schemes when we remove the
matching profile from EMULATED-LARGE.
6. GENERIC MATCHING PROBLEM
This section evaluates the reliability of matching schemes based on
classifiers aimed at solving the generic case of the matching prob-
lem (see §2). We build classifiers that are conceptually similar to
what previous works have done. The primary difference between
different previous matching schemes is the features and the datasets
they used to train and test classifiers, however, they all use tradi-
tional classifier such as SVM and Naive Bayes. The goal of this
section is not to build a matching scheme that is better than previ-
ous ones but to investigate the limits of such schemes in practice.
We first emulate the methodology employed by previous works:
we train and test matching schemes with RANDOM-SAMPLED, us-
ing all attributes. Since some profile attributes have a high discrim-
inability in the dataset, it is straightforward to build a matching
scheme with high reliability. On top of this, there is little differ-
ence between the reliability of naive classification techniques and
more sophisticated ones.
We then investigating the reliability of matching schemes in prac-
tice by testing them over EMULATED-LARGE. As expected, the
precision of the previously built matching schemes drastically de-
creases to a point that makes them unusable. Thereafter, we in-
vestigate the reasons behind such poor reliability and we evaluate
different strategies to increase the precision and recall in practice.
The resulting schemes are able to achieve a good precision, but
the recall is still low. These results show the inherent difficulty of
matching profiles reliably in today’s large social networks.
6.1 Evaluation over RANDOM-SAMPLED
We use the RANDOM-SAMPLED dataset to train and test four clas-
sification techniques to match profiles: Naive Bayes, Decision Trees,
Logistic Regression, and SVM. We split RANDOM-SAMPLED in
two: 70% for training and 30% for testing.
There are two important aspects to handle when training classi-
fiers to match profiles: (1) classes are very imbalanced – there are
much more non-matching profiles than matching profiles. Previous
works handled this problem by balancing the training instances by
under-sampling the majority class [13]. We also adopt this tech-
nique and we randomly sample 850 non-matching profiles from
the RANDOM-SAMPLED; (2) features have missing values – some
attribute values may be unavailable hence the similarity value is
missing (e.g., users may choose to omit their location or photo).
Thus, we must either work with classification techniques that are
robust to missing values (e.g., Naive Bayes) or identify methods to
impute the missing values.
We use 10-fold cross validation on the training data to evaluate
the four classifiers with different combinations of parameters and
different methods for imputing the missing feature values. We call
the four resulting classifiers with the best optimized parameters the
LINKER-NB, LINKER-SVM, LINKER-LR and LINKER-DT.
We investigate the tradeoff between precision and recall for the
different classifiers in Figure 2a. Our results show that LINKER-
NB out of the box, without imputing the missing values and LINKER-
SVM and LINKER-DT when we replace missing values with -1
achieve the highest reliability with a recall over 90% for a 95%
precision. LINKER-LR achieves a lower recall, only 85% for the
same precision. Thus, as expected, even out of the box classifi-
cation techniques such as Naive Bayes are able to achieve a high
precision and recall over RANDOM-SAMPLED.
Analysis of matched pairs: To understand what pairs of profiles
the classifiers are matching, we analyze in Table 4 the availabil-
ity and consistency of attributes for the true matches, the false
matches, and the missed matches (the pairs of matching profiles
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Figure 2: Precision and recall tradeoff for matching Twitter to Face-
book profiles using different classifiers when evaluated over RANDOM-
SAMPLED and EMULATED-LARGE.
Table 4: Fraction of true, missed and false matches that have available and
consistent attributes in RANDOM-SAMPLED.
Fraction of available and consistent attributes
Feature All True Missed False
Matches Matches Matches Matches
Real Name 0.77 0.91 0.20 0.62
Screen Name 0.38 0.46 0.07 0.09
Location 0.23 0.25 0.14 0.00
Profile Photo 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.00
Friends 0.34 0.34 0.22 0.38
that are not detected by the classifier). We use LINKER-SVM with
a threshold on the probability p (outputted by the classifier) cor-
responding to a 95% precision (and 90% recall) to select the true,
missed and false matches. The table shows that the only matching
profiles the LINKER-SVM is not able to identify are the ones that
do not have available and consistent attributes: only 20% of the
missed matches have consistent names and 53% of missed matches
do not have any consistent and available attribute (not shown in the
table). The table also shows that the LINKER-SVM easily mis-
takes non-matching profiles form matching profiles if they have ei-
ther consistent names or friends. While in this dataset this is not
problematic, in practice this will lead to many false matches.
6.2 Evaluation over EMULATED-LARGE
Figure 2b presents the tradeoff between precision and recall when
we evaluate using EMULATED-LARGE the four LINKER classi-
fiers trained on RANDOM-SAMPLED. The figure shows that when
matching profiles in practice the reliability of all four classifiers
drops significantly compared to RANDOM-SAMPLED (presented in
Figure 2a). The best classifier on the RANDOM-SAMPLED, LINKER-
NB, achieve only a 4.5% precision for a 23% recall when tested on
EMULATED-LARGE. The only classifier that achieves a satisfying
95% precision is LINKER-SVM, however, the recall is only 15%.
These results confirm our intuition that the reliability of a match-
ing scheme over RANDOM-SAMPLED fails to capture the reliability
of the matching scheme in practice. Worse, the matching scheme
that has the best reliability when testing with RANDOM-SAMPLED
(i.e., the LINKER-NB) can be amongst the worst in practice.
Optimizing the binary classifiers
LINKER-NB: We investigate the reasons for the low precision of
LINKER-NB in EMULATED-LARGE. The results in Figure 1 show
that matching profiles often have consistent names whereas non-
matching profiles (from sample) most often do not; there is no such
clear distinction for the other attributes. Since Naive Bayes as-
sumes that features are independent, the probability that two pro-
files match will be mainly determined by their name similarity. In
a large social network, however, multiple users can have the same
name, which will cause LINKER-NB to output many false matches.
One way to make the classification more accurate is to use two
classifiers in cascade instead of one. The first classifier weeds out
profiles that are clear non-matches (most of which have different
names). Then, the second classifier takes the output of the first
and disambiguates the matching profiles out of profiles with similar
names. We call this improved classifier LINKER-NB+. For more
details about this approach please refer to [11].
Another approach to make the classification more accurate is to
use methods based on joint probabilities such as quadratic discrim-
inant analysis. We prefer to move to SVM which also considers
features jointly and is not restricted to quadratic boundaries.
LINKER-SVM: LINKER-SVM has a much higher precision in
EMULATED-LARGE than LINKER-NB. Intuitively, this is because,
as opposed to Naive Bayes, SVM considers the features jointly and
hence can distinguish between pairs of profiles with high name sim-
ilarity that match and pairs of profiles with high name similarity
that do not match based on other features. Nevertheless, previ-
ous work has shown that SVM performs suboptimally when using
under-sampling to deal with imbalanced datasets [6]. By under-
sampling the majority class, we are missing informative data points
close to the decision boundary.
To improve the reliability of LINKER-SVM, we take advantage
of the fact that EMULATED-LARGE contains negative examples
close to the decision boundary, to enrich our training set. We build
a training set that contains 850 positive examples, 850 negative
examples from RANDOM-SAMPLED plus 850 negative examples
from EMULATED-LARGE. We call the resulting classifier the LINKER-
SVM+. Note that if we only use for training negative examples
from EMULATED-LARGE and not from RANDOM-SAMPLED, the
resulting classifier will only be able to distinguish the matching
profiles out of profiles that look similar and will not be able to dis-
tinguish the matching profile out of profiles that are clearly not sim-
ilar, i.e., it will only work on datasets such as EMULATED-LARGE
and not in practice. For LINKER-LR and LINKER-DT we apply
the same retraining technique.
Evaluation of optimized classifiers: Figure 2c shows the tradeoff
between precision and recall when using LINKER-SVM+, LINKER-
NB+, LINKER-LR+, LINKER-DT+ on EMULATED-LARGE. We
can see that LINKER-SVM+ is able to achieve a 19% recall (4%
improvement over the LINKER-SVM) for a 95% precision.5 Also,
LINKER-NB+ achieves a 23% recall for a 88% precision, consid-
erably better than LINKER-NB. Nevertheless, the recall is signifi-
cantly lower compared with the recall obtained when testing with
RANDOM-SAMPLED. Thus, even more sophisticated techniques
trained to match profiles in real-word settings fail to match a large
fraction of profiles.
Analysis of matched pairs: To understand the low recall we ob-
tain in EMULATED-LARGE, we analyze again the availability and
consistency of attributes. The precision of LINKER-SVM+ has a
sudden drop, to go from a recall of 19% to 33%, the precision goes
from 95% to 0.02%. To analyze the drop, we split the pairs of
profiles in EMULATED-LARGE in true, missed, and false matches
using first a threshold corresponding to a 95% precision (and a 19%
recall) and then with a threshold corresponding to a 0.02% preci-
5In DATASET G+, LINKER-SVM+ has 50% recall and 95% precision.
Table 5: Fraction of true, missed and false matches that have available and
consistent attributes in EMULATED-LARGE.
Fraction of available and consistent attributes
95% precision and 19% recall 0.02% precision and 33% recall
Feature True Missed False True Missed False
Matches Matches Matches Matches Matches Matches
Real Name 0.94 0.73 0.86 0.94 0.69 1.00
Screen Name 0.60 0.33 0.57 0.64 0.26 0.89
Location 0.32 0.21 0.14 0.41 0.15 0.01
Profile Photo 0.14 0.07 0.57 0.16 0.04 0.07
Friends 0.91 0.17 0.57 0.68 0.14 0.00
sion (and a 33% recall), see Table 5.
Contrarily to our expectation, for most attributes but friends, the
availability and consistency of true matches at 0.02% precision is
actually slightly higher than the one at 95% precision. Only the
availability and consistency of friends decreases from 91% at 95%
precision to 68% at 0.02% precision. This means that, to go from
19% to 33% recall we mainly started to match profiles that do not
have friends in common. The consequence is that while at 95%
precision, the false matches needed to have friends in common, at
0.02% precision, false matches no longer need to have friends in
common. This makes the matching scheme have orders of magni-
tude more false matches at 33% recall than at 19% recall. Thus,
even if the features are highly available and consistent, if they are
not discriminable enough, they will allow for many false matches
which limits the precision and recall we can achieve in practice.
The results suggest that when matching profiles in practice, to
maintain a high precision, we need features that are highly dis-
criminable. Indeed, if we exclude friends (one of the most discrim-
inable attributes) from the features we use for the classification, we
can only achieve a 11% recall for a 90% precision.
7. SPECIAL MATCHING PROBLEM
The previous section showed that even fine tuned classifiers are vul-
nerable to output many false matches in practice. Worse, previous
matching schemes are not able to protect against impersonation at-
tacks. In this section, we propose ways to mitigate both of these
problems in the special case where we know that there exists at
most one matching profile in SN2.
The TOPMATCH: The straw man approach is, for each profile a1,
to simply return the profile in C(a1) with the highest probability p
to be the matching profile given by LINKER-SVM+, provided that
p is larger than a threshold. We call the most similar profile the
TOPMATCH. This approach reduces the number of false matches
since the matching scheme outputs at most one false match. Fig-
ure 2d displays the tradeoff between precision and recall obtained
for different probability thresholds on the p of the TOPMATCH. It
shows that TOPMATCH largely improves recall for a given preci-
sion: TOPMATCH in EMULATED-LARGE achieves to a 26% recall
for a 95% precision.
The GUARD: The strategy of outputting the TOPMATCH consider-
ably increases the recall compared to approaches in §6. However, it
is still vulnerable to output false matches in practice when Twitter
users who do not have a Facebook profile. Worse, the TOPMATCH
is vulnerable to impersonation attacks that also hinder the reliabil-
ity of the matching scheme. We propose next a simple solution that
mitigates both of these problems by comparing the probability to
be the matching profile of the most similar profile in C(a1), p1st,
and the probability of the second most similar profile, p2nd. The
high level idea is that, to be sure that the most similar profile in
C(a1) is the matching profile, p1st should be much higher than the
probability p of any profile in C(a1), i.e., p1st ≫ p2nd.
Intuitively, there are two possible scenarios where the TOPMATCH
is a false match: The first is if an attacker creates an impersonating
profile on SN2 that is more similar than the true matching profile.
It might be possible to detect these cases as both p1st and p2nd will
be high and (p1st − p2nd) will be very small. The second is when
the true matching profile aˆ2 is in C(a1) but a non-matching profile
a2 ∈ C(a1) is chosen as output because the classifier assigns it a
higher probability p of being the matching profile (due to the lack
of attribute availability and/or consistency). Another case is when
aˆ2 does not exist, forcing the scheme to choose the non-matching
profile that is the most similar to a1 as the output. We might de-
tect these cases as p1st and p2nd will not be very high (none of the
profiles in C(a1) are very similar to a1) and (p1st − p2nd) will
be again very small (none of the profiles in C(a1) is much more
similar than the rest).
To incorporate the above logic, we design the GUARD which is
a binary classifier that takes as input p1st and p2nd and outputs the
probability that the TOPMATCH is the matching profile. Figure 2d
shows that the GUARD increases the recall of the matching scheme
to 29% for a 95% precision. Although 29% recall is a big improve-
ment over the recall previously obtained, the recall is still low. This
shows that in practice, it is hard to achieve a high recall if we want
to have a high precision.
The matching schemes in §6 decide independently for each pair
(a1, a2) where a2 ∈ C(a1) whether it is a match or not. In con-
trast, the strength of the GUARD is that it exploits the structure
of C(a1) for a given a1. In particular, since C(a1) depends on
a1, for a given probability p to be the matching profile of a1, the
TOPMATCH profile a2 will be declared a match for some a1 if its
attribute values are sufficiently unique, whereas the scheme will
return nothing for other a1 if the attribute values are too common
(e.g., Jennifer Clark that lives in New York). This reduces consid-
erably the false matches and, as we have shown, increases a lot the
matching recall for a given precision.
Reliability in the absence of a matching profile: To test the re-
liability of the matching scheme in the absence of a matching pro-
file, we take the EMULATED-LARGE and we remove the matching
profiles from the dataset. Then, we evaluate the GUARD over the
resulting dataset. Ideally, the GUARD should not return any profile
as there is no matching profile in the dataset. Indeed, the GUARD
only returns a false match for 1% of the Twitter profiles. We man-
ually investigate the 1% cases: in half the returned profile is a false
match; in the other half it is actually a profile that corresponds to
the same person (the returned profiles are either impersonators or
people that maintain duplicate profiles on Facebook). Thus, the
GUARD is reliable when there is no matching profile in SN2.
8. EVALUATION AGAINST HUMANS
In this section, we confirm the inherent difficulty to obtain a high
recall in matching profiles in practice by comparing our results with
results obtained by asking human workers to match profiles.
For this we designed an AMT experiment. We randomly select
200 Twitter-Facebook matching profiles from DATASET FF (that
are not used for training the matching schemes). In each assign-
ment, we give AMT workers a link to a Twitter profile as well as
links to the 10 most similar Facebook profiles (we shuffle their po-
sition) and we ask AMT workers to choose the matching profile.
We allow workers to choose that they are unable to identify the
matching profile. For each assignment we ask the opinion of three
different workers. We present the results for majority agreement
(two out of three workers decided on the same answer). We design
two versions of the experiment: in the first one if the matching pro-
file is not in C(a1), the matching profile will not be in the list of 10
Facebook profiles; and a second version, where we always put the
matching profile the list of 10 Facebook profiles.
In the first version of the experiment, AMT workers were able
to match 40% of the Twitter profiles to their matching profiles and
4% are matched to the wrong Facebook profile. This means that
AMT workers achieve a 40% recall for a 96% precision, which is
better than the GUARD, but far from a 100% recall. In the second
version of the experiment, AMT workers were able to match 58%
of Twitter profiles. Thus, even humans cannot achieve a recall close
to 100% to match profiles in practice.
9. RELATED WORKS
We review three primary lines of related research: one proposing
schemes to match user profiles across different social networks;
one focusing on how anonymized user graphs or databases can be
deanonymized to infer user identities; and another about matching
entities across databases.
Matching profiles using private user data: Balduzzi et al. [8]
match profiles on different social networks using the “Friend Finder”
mechanism that social networks provide for users to find their friends
using their email addresses. In fact, this is what we use for obtain-
ing our ground truth. Many sites, however, view Friend Finder as
leaking users’ private data and have since limited the number of
queries a user can make which severely limits the number of pro-
files one can match. In contrast, we are interested in understanding
the limits of matching profiles by only using public attributes that
anyone can access without assuming that we have access to more
private data such as the emails of users.
Matching profiles using public user data: A number of previ-
ous studies proposed matching schemes that leveraged different at-
tributes of public user data to match profiles, but without systemat-
ically understanding their limitations in real-world social networks.
As a result, previous works overlooked a number of methodolog-
ical aspects: (1) Most works did not train and test their match-
ing schemes on sampled datasets that preserve the reliability of
the original social network. Consequently, the reliability of these
schemes drops significantly when evaluated in real-world social
networks [28, 22, 29, 33, 27, 18, 36, 35]; (2) Most works used at-
tributes without analyzing their properties and their limits to match
profiles in practice, consequently, some of these studies use at-
tributes with low availability and thus can only match a small frac-
tion of profiles across a limited number of social networks [12, 14]
or use attributes that are prone to give many false matches in prac-
tice [21]. On the contrary, we propose a framework to analyze
attributes and evaluate their potential to match profiles in practice.
(3) Most studies used biased sets of ground truth users that will-
ingly publish links to their profiles on different social networks.
Our analysis reveals that such datasets have attributes that are more
available and consistent, consequently, the reliability results of such
schemes are overly optimistic [25, 20, 28, 36]. Other studies as-
sume that all profiles that have the same screen name are match-
ing [17, 14]. In §4.4 we showed that 20% of profiles with the same
screen name in Twitter and Facebook are actually not matching. We
further split these studies according to the type of attributes used.
The closest to our work are a number of schemes that leverage
information in the profiles of users similar to the attributes we use
in this paper [22, 28, 20, 25, 5, 34, 33, 29, 24, 27, 18, 36, 35,
34, 17]. Most schemes work by training classifiers to distinguish
between matching and non-matching profiles. We simulated these
approaches in §6 and we saw that, because they did not consider
the problems that come with matching in practice, the matching
schemes are very unreliable when evaluated in real-world social
networks. A few studies attempted to perform profile matching in
practice [20, 25, 5]. These studies, however, just pointed out that
profile matching in practice yields a large number of false matches.
In contrast, we conduct a systematic analysis of the causes of such
false matches and possible ways to eliminate them.
Other schemes use attributes extracted from user activities (i.e.,
the content users generate instead of attributes of the profile) [12,
21, 14]. These schemes reveal how even innocuous activities of
users can help identify a user across social networks. However,
these schemes explore attributes with either low availability or low
discriminability, which makes them hard to use in practice without
sacrificing reliability.
De-anonymizing user identities: De-anonymizing user identities
and matching user profiles share common methods. In fact, our
work here is inspired by one of the seminal papers of Sweeney [32],
which explored the uniqueness of attributes such as date of birth,
postal code, and gender to de-anonymize medical records of US cit-
izens. Other studies [23, 15] showed the feasibility to de-anonymize
the friendship graph of a social network at large-scale using the
friendship graph of another social network as auxiliary informa-
tion. The structure of the social graph is certainly a powerful fea-
ture. Nevertheless, in this work, we explicitly assume that we can-
not have access to the entire graph structure of the social networks
since we only use public APIs to collect data. We leave as future
work how to exploit partial graphs that can be obtained trough APIs
to improve matching schemes based on binary classifiers.
Entity matching: There is a large body of research in the database
and information retrieval communities on matching entities across
different data sources [9]. Conceptually there are many similarities
between matching profiles across social networks and matching en-
tities (e.g. the way we compute the similarities between attributes
or the adoption of a supervised way to detect matches). However,
matching profiles has some specific constraints (e.g., not being able
to access all records in SN1) that the entity matching community,
to our knowledge, overlooked.
10. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we conducted a systematic and detailed investigation
of the reliably of matching user profiles across real-world online
social networks like Twitter and Facebook. Our analysis yielded a
number of methodological and measurement contributions.
To understand how profile attributes used by matching schemes
affect the overall matching reliability, we proposed a framework
that consist of four properties – Availability, Consistency, Imper-
sonability, and Discriminability (ACID). Our analysis showed that
most people maintain the same persona across different social net-
works – thus it is possible to match the profiles of many users,
however, in practice there can be a non negligible number of pro-
files that belong to different users but have similar attribute values,
which leads to false matches.
We showed that the reliability of matching schemes that are trained
and tested on reliability non-preserving sampled datasets is not in-
dicative of their reliability in practice. In fact, traditional matching
schemes based on binary classifiers can only achieve a 19% recall
for a 95% precision to match Twitter to Facebook profiles in prac-
tice. To avoid these pitfalls we illustrated the right assumptions we
can make about the matching problem and the correct methodology
to evaluate matching schemes in realistic scenarios.
Finally, we proposed a matching scheme that is able to mitigate
impersonation attacks and reduce the number of false matches to
achieve a 29% recall for a 95% precision. Our matching scheme
exploits a special case of the matching problem, namely that there
exists at most one matching profile. Although we cannot claim
that 29% is a high recall, humans cannot do much better (they only
detect 40% of matching profiles).
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APPENDIX
A. PROOFS FROM SECTION 3
A.1 Effective discriminability formula
In this section, we justify that, if we assume that the impersonat-
ing profiles are independent from the other non-matching profiles,
we have D˜ = D · (pnI + nI · pI). We first apply the complete
probability formula:
D˜=Pr
(
max
a2:a2-non-match-a1
s(v1, v2) < th
)
=Pr
(
max
a2:a2-non-match-a1
s(v1, v2) < th
∣∣a1 not impersonated
)
pnI
+Pr
(
max
a2:a2-non-match-a1
s(v1, v2)<th
∣∣a1 impersonated
)
pI . (1)
Then, we observe that themax on all non-matching profile is smaller
than th iif both the max on all non-matching profile that are not im-
personating a1 and the max on the impersonators of a1 are smaller
than th. That is:
Pr
(
max
a2:a2-non-match-a1
s(v1, v2) < th
∣∣a1 impersonated
)
= Pr
(
max
a
2:a2-non-match-a1
a
2
-non-imperso-a1
s(v1, v2) < th, (2)
max
a2:a2-impersonate-a1
s(v1, v2) < th
∣∣∣a1 impersonated
)
.
If the impersonating profiles are independent from the other non-
matching profiles, then the joint probability equals the product of
probabilities:
Pr
(
max
a2:a2-non-match-a1
s(v1, v2) < th
∣∣a1 impersonated
)
= Pr
(
max
a
2:a2-non-match-a1
a
2
-non-imperso-a1
s(v1, v2) < th
∣∣∣a1 impersonated
)
·
Pr
(
max
a2:a2-impersonate-a1
s(v1, v2) < th
∣∣a1 impersonated
)
= D · nI ;
which, given (1), shows that D˜ = D · (pnI + nI · pI).
A.2 Proofs of Theorem 1
In this section, we give a proof of Theorem 1. Recall that th is
a threshold parameter in [0, 1] such that the classifier declares a
match between a1 and a2 if s(v1, v2) > th.
To show (i), first recall the definition of recall:
recall = Pr
(
s(v1, v2) > th|a2-match-a1
)
.
Then, we have
recall =Pr
(
s(v1, v2) > th|a2-match-a1, v1 and v2 available
)
· Pr(v1 and v2 available|a2-match-a1)
+ Pr
(
s(v1, v2) > th|a2-match-a1, v1 or v2 not available
)
· Pr(v1 or v2 not available|a2-match-a1).
By convention, s(v1, v2) = 0 if v1 or v2 not available (a pair is
never declared a match by the classifier if either value is missing).
Therefore, Pr
(
s(v1, v2) > th|a2-match-a1, v1 or v2 not available
)
=
0 and we have recall = C ·A by definition of C and A.
To show (ii), first recall the definition of precision:
precision = Pr
(
a2-match-a1|s(v1, v2) > th
)
.
To ease the equations reading, we simplify the notation of a2-match-a1
into simply match and similarly for a2-non-match-a1. By applica-
tion of Bayes formula, we compute
precision
=
Pr(match, s(v1, v2) > th)
Pr(match, s(v1, v2) > th) + Pr(non-match, s(v1, v2) > th)
=
recall · Pr(match)
recall · Pr(match) + Pr(non-match, s(v1, v2) > th) .
Let n2 denote the number of profiles in SN26. By the assump-
tion of Theorem 1-(ii), we have Pr(match) ≤ 1/n2, so that, since
Pr(non-match, s(v1, v2) > th) ≥ 0, we get
precision ≤
recall
recall + n2 · Pr(non-match, s(v1, v2) > th)
.
Moreover, by definition of D˜, we have
Pr(non-match, s(v1, v2) > th) ≥ 1− D˜
n2
,
which gives
precision ≤
recall
recall + 1− D˜
and concludes the proof of Theorem 1-(ii).
We now show (iii), by making three observations:
a. First, observe that, from (i), we directly get that recall = 1 iif
A = C = 1.
6Note that n2 includes impersonating profiles and hence formally
is a random variable. Rigorously, we should condition on the value
of n2 and then take the expectation; however the result would be
unchanged hence we omit this detail for a lighter presentation.
b. Second, observe that precision = 1 iif D˜ = 1. Indeed, we have
precision = 1 iif Pr(a2-non-match-a1, s(v1, s2) > th) = 0,
which is equivalent to Pr(maxa2:a2-non-match-a1 s(v1, v2) > th) =
0 and hence to D˜ = 1.
c. Third, observe that D = nI = 1 implies D˜ = 1 and that, if
pI > 0, the converse holds too. We show the two separately.
(⇒) : Assume that D = nI = 1. The result follows from the fol-
lowing facts: if D = 1 then the first term of (1) multiplying pnI is
1; and from (2), if D = 1 and D = 1 and nI = 1, then the second
term of (1) multiplying pI is 1. Therefore, D˜ = 1.
(⇐) : Assume that D˜ = 1 and pI > 0. If D < 1, then both terms
of (1) multiplying pnI and pI are strictly smaller than one which
contradicts D˜ = 1. Therefore D = 1. If nI < 1, the second term
of (1) multiplying pI is strictly smaller than one which contradicts
D˜ = 1 since pI > 0. Therefore nI = 1.
The combination of these three observations implies Theorem 1-
(iii). (In fact, these three observations give more detailed results on
the impact of ACID on precision and recall than what is summa-
rized in Theorem 1-(iii).)
B. ATTRIBUTE SIMILARITY METRICS
Name similarity: Previous work in the record linkage community
showed that the Jaro string distance is the most suitable metric to
compare similarity between names both in the offline and online
worlds [10, 28]. So we use the Jaro distance to measure the simi-
larity between real names and screen names.
Photo similarity: Estimating photo similarity is tricky as the same
photo can come in different formats. To measure the similarity
of two photos while accounting for image transformations, we use
two matching techniques: (i) perceptual hashing, a technique orig-
inally invented for identifying illegal copies of copyrighted content
that works by reducing the image to a transformation-resilient “fin-
gerprint” containing its salient characteristics [2] and (ii) SIFT, a
size invariant algorithm that detects local features in an image and
checks if two images are similar by counting the number of local
features that match between two images [19]. We use two different
algorithms for robustness. The perceptual hashing technique does
not cope well with some images that are resized, while the SIFT
algorithm does not cope well with computer generated images.
Location similarity: For all profiles, we have the textual represen-
tations of the location, like the name of a city. Since social networks
use different formats for this information, a simple textual compar-
ison will be inaccurate. Instead, we convert the location to lati-
tude/longitude coordinates by submitting them to the Bing API [1].
We then compute the similarity between two locations as the actual
geodesic distance between the corresponding coordinates.
Friends similarity: The similarity score is the number of com-
mon friends between two profiles. We consider that two profiles
have a common friend if there is a profile with the same screen
name or real name in both friend lists. A more complex but po-
tentially more accurate method would have been to apply a match-
ing scheme for each friend recursively taking other features beside
screen name and real name into account. As we will see, however,
given two small lists of profiles on different social networks, real
names and screen names alone can accurately identify matching
profiles. Complementary, we could divide the number of common
friends by the total number of friends. Preliminary results showed
no particular improvement in doing so.
